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Abstract 
This article reviews the current epidemiology and clinical presentation of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona-
virus (MERS-CoV) infection and describes the preparedness plan of several countries. The MERS-CoV was first reported 
in 2012 and has since infected more than 1600 patients in 26 countries, mostly in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. 
The epidemiology of the infection is compatible with multiple introductions of the virus into humans from an animal 
reservoir, probably dromedary camels. The clinical presentation ranges from no symptoms to severe pneumonitis and 
respiratory failure. Most confirmed cases so far were part of MERS-CoV clusters in hospital settings, affecting mainly 
middle-aged men and patients with a chronic disease or immuno-suppressed status. There is no vaccine or anti-viral 
medication available. Viral epidemics can occur anywhere in today’s “global village”. MERS-CoV is a relatively new virus, 
and this work is intended to add to the still-sparse data on its epidemiology, modes of transmission, natural history, 
and clinical features as well as to describe the preparedness plan for MERS-CoV infection in several countries. Effective 
national and international preparedness plans are essential to predict and control outbreaks, improve patient man-
agement, and ensure global health security.
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Background
Middle East respiratory syndrome is caused by a novel 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) first isolated in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in 2012 from the respiratory tract secre-
tions of a Saudi businessman who died from viral pneu-
monia [1]. Health officials first reported the disease in 
September 2012, when most cases originated in Saudi 
Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Subsequently, cases were identified in patients liv-
ing outside the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, 
who were infected either during a stay in the Middle East 
or by close contact with an individual from an endemic 
country [2]. Although the virus has no gender predisposi-
tion, most affected patients have been previously healthy 
men with a median age of 50 years [3].
Epidemiology
The origin of MERS-CoV has been widely discussed. 
Originally, a bat reservoir was posited based on the phy-
logenetic similarity of certain bat coronaviruses with 
MERS-CoV [4, 5]. However, the exact MERS-CoV strain 
found in humans has not been identified in any bat spe-
cies [6, 7]. Furthermore, in almost none of the known 
cases to date was there a clear bat source of infection or a 
consistent history of contact with bats.
Another possibility is the dromedary camel. Drom-
edary camels have been found to harbor the same MERS-
CoV and MERS-CoV-like antibodies as humans and to 
shed the virus in high numbers in secretions from the 
upper respiratory tract [8]. Studies of archived secretion 
samples obtained from camels in Dubai in 2005 revealed 
neutralizing antibodies to MERS-CoV, indicating that the 
virus is not new to the Arabian Peninsula. These findings 
also suggest that MERS-CoV is widespread and has previ-
ously infected various camel populations, including some 
in countries where human cases have yet to be reported 
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[9]. Camels are currently recognized as the main animal 
reservoir, with primary cases occurring in areas where 
they are an important part of life. Unpasteurized camel 
milk may be a route of transmission, but so far there are 
no data that MERS-CoV is excreted into camel milk [10].
The outbreak of the novel virus among humans was 
first reported in April 2012, when eight healthcare work-
ers from one intensive care unit in Jordan had respiratory 
illness; however, the source was unknown at that time 
[11]. In June 2012, a 60-year-old man presented in Saudi 
Arabia with acute pneumonia and subsequent renal 
failure, which eventually led to his death. A previously 
unknown coronavirus was detected in his sputum and 
provisionally called human coronavirus Erasmus Medical 
Center (hCoV-EMC) [1]. Shortly thereafter, in Septem-
ber 2012, the same virus was detected in a patient with 
severe respiratory illness who had been transferred from 
the Middle East to the United Kingdom. Combining with 
retrospective analysis of stored samples from the afore-
mentioned outbreak in Jordan, the novel virus, renamed 
MERS-CoV, was recognized as the cause of a new severe 
respiratory disease [12].
The epidemiology of MERS-CoV infection since isola-
tion of the pathogen in 2012 is compatible with multiple 
introductions of the virus into humans from the ani-
mal reservoir, with no long-term sustained human-to-
human transmission [13]. The recent epidemic might be 
explained by progressive changes that have taken place in 
camel farming in Saudi Arabia, leading to a large increase 
in the population of camels and in camel farms in the 
proximity of cities [14].
On March 23, 2016, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) published a report on 1698 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of MERS-CoV infection [15]. The case-fatality rate 
was approximately 36  % [15]. All cases were directly or 
indirectly linked through residence or travel to 10 coun-
tries: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, 
Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran [15]. There are also 
reports of sporadic export of the disease to countries in four 
continents, including the United Kingdom, France, Tunisia, 
Italy, Malaysia, Greece, Austria, Turkey, the United States 
of America, Germany, Philippines, and Thailand [15–17]. 
The largest outbreak of the virus outside its endemic region 
began in May 2015, with the first-ever confirmed case in 
South Korea, in a patient who had recently visited several 
countries in the Arabian Peninsula. Over the next 2 months, 
186 additional cases were confirmed, including the first in 
China, with a total of 36 deaths. The last confirmed case in 
this region was recorded in July 2015 [18].
Clinical presentation and risk factors
The median incubation period of MERS-CoV is 5  days 
(range 2–14  days) during which time the host remains 
asymptomatic. The clinical presentation of the disease 
is wide, ranging from no symptoms to mild upper res-
piratory symptoms such as fever, cough, and myalgia to 
severe pneumonitis and respiratory failure. Gastrointes-
tinal symptoms are also common, including loss of appe-
tite, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. 
Less common manifestations are hemoptysis or diarrhea 
without fever [19, 20].
Some studies suggest that diabetes, hypertension, 
chronic heart disease, and chronic kidney disease are 
risk factors for MERC-CoV infection and a severe clini-
cal presentation [19]; however, this theory needs to be 
further investigated. The majority of confirmed cases 
were MERS-CoV cluster cases in hospital settings, and 
the main risk factors were male gender, underlying 
chronic disease, immunosuppressive status, and hospi-
tal stay [19]. The male predominance may reflect Middle 
East societal practices, which heighten the likelihood of 
exposure in males relative to females, or a higher rate 
of certain underlying medical conditions among older 
men.
There has been a recent increase in reports of asymp-
tomatic or mild MERS-CoV infection among women and 
children. However, there are no corresponding findings 
on contact tracing among healthcare workers or close 
contacts of infected patients in German, UK and US 
hospitals, or in serologic surveys of blood derived from 
donors and abattoir workers in endemic regions in 2012 
[21]. Therefore, it is hard to estimate the proportion of 
asymptomatic patients among infected individuals.
Currently, no vaccine or anti-viral medication is 
approved for the treatment of patients with MERS-CoV 
infection, and primary treatment is supportive [22]. Nev-
ertheless, new vaccines are under research and devel-
opment and some candidates are paving their way for 
phase-I trials in humans [23–25]. These include a vac-
cine based on the major surface spike (S) protein using 
recombinant nanoparticle technology, a full-length infec-
tious cDNA clone of the MERS-CoV genome in a bac-
terial artificial chromosome, a recombinant modified 
vaccinia Ankara vaccine expressing full-length MERS-
CoV spike protein, and vaccines encoding the full-length 
MERS-CoV S protein and the S1 extracellular domain of 
S protein using adenovirus vectors.
National preparedness plans and public health 
response for MERS‑CoV infection
The emergence of new unknown virus in conjunc-
tion with high fatality rate of the disease has led to 
major public health and international concern [15]. 
The WHO guidelines apply a relatively sensitive defi-
nition of suspected cases and emphasize the impor-
tance of a high index of clinical suspicion for diagnosis 
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owing to the high mortality rate. Some countries, espe-
cially those in endemic regions, have developed their 
own preparedness and response plans which are based 
on WHO and Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC)’s recommendations. The Oman’s Ministry of 
Health implemented a national plan which was based on 
strengthening five pillars of action, including: (1) pub-
lic health surveillance and contact management. Field 
visits were conducted to every confirmed case by the 
national public health services and exposed individuals 
were monitored for 14  days after the last exposure; (2) 
building laboratory capacity, including diagnostic capac-
ity with primers for MERS-CoV testing, and training 
laboratory personnel on triple-packing and shipment of 
samples. Furthermore, training to first responders and 
intensivists on how to collect nasopharyngeal samples; 
(3) infection prevention and control, including mask-fit 
testing for all healthcare workers who could be involved 
in patient care; (4) case management; and (5) risk com-
munication [26]. The government of the Republic of 
Korea summoned a Rapid Response Team following 
the outbreak in their country. The team was composed 
of infectious disease specialists and infection control 
professionals, and they established national guidelines 
for the diagnosis and management of MERS-CoV infec-
tion. Together with the epidemiology investigation team 
of the local government, control strategies were dis-
cussed, which included: (1) contact tracing; (2) surveil-
lance of polymerase chain reaction testing of healthcare 
workers and patients according to their level of contact; 
(3) preemptive isolation of pneumonia cases; (4) envi-
ronmental disinfection; and (5) cleaning and enforcing 
the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) among 
healthcare providers [27]. The possibility of MERS-CoV 
occurring in Israel is high given Israel’s geographic loca-
tion in the Middle East and the thousands of Israeli Mos-
lems who make the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) each 
year. Therefore, the Israel Ministry of Health (IMOH) 
has drafted preparedness guidelines that generally follow 
the CDC guidelines, although the CDC did not include 
Israel among the countries at risk. These guidelines rec-
ommend laboratory evaluation for all healthcare work-
ers with a severe acute respiratory illness of unknown 
etiology, and in cases of clusters of severe respiratory 
symptoms of known etiology. In addition, the approval 
of the public health services is required before any case 
may be designated a suspected MERS-CoV infection, 
thereby ensuring early involvement on a national level 
in every instance of the disease. Information regarding 
MERS-CoV was disseminated by the distribution of leaf-
lets and placement of informative posters at Ben-Gurion 
International Airport and three land-border crossings 
between Israel and Jordan [28].
Case definition
The probable case definition of MERS-CoV infection is 
based on clinical and epidemiological criteria, and it is 
dynamic, subject to modification as more data become 
available. According to the current, updated defini-
tion, MERS-CoV is suspected in a patient with fever and 
acute respiratory symptoms who meets the following 
epidemiological conditions: contact with a patient with 
a confirmed diagnosis, either directly or through clini-
cal samples, within 14 days prior to symptom onset, or a 
visit to a country in or near the Arabian Peninsula within 
14  days prior to symptom onset [15]. The diagnosis is 
confirmed by laboratory confirmation.
Laboratory diagnosis
The CDC recommends the collection of multiple speci-
mens from different sites, including upper respiratory 
tract, lower respiratory tract and serum, at different 
times after symptom onset [29]. Laboratory diagnosis is 
based on the detection of the virus in upper respiratory 
and lower respiratory samples by using real-time reverse 
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) 
assay. This detection is performed by targeting upstream 
regions of the E gene (upE) or within open reading frame 
(ORF)1b, using upE for screening and ORF1b for confir-
mation. Another real-time RT-PCR assay targeting the 
MERS-CoV nucleocapsid protein gene has been devel-
oped and can be used for screening and confirmation. 
When there are discordant results between two real-time 
RT-PCR assays, the sequencing of an amplicon generated 
from an appropriate RT-PCR assay should be performed 
to confirm test results. Lower respiratory tract specimens 
have been found to be more sensitive than upper respira-
tory tract specimens for the detection of MERS-CoV. In 
addition, the development of a rapid diagnostic kit is 
important for the timely diagnosis of suspected MERS-
CoV cases. Serological testing can be used to screen the 
contacts of infected patients and to retrospectively con-
firm MERS-CoV infections [30]. Virus isolation in cell 
culture is not recommended at this time since it requires 
laboratory working under high biosafety level [29].
Infection control
Some epidemiological data support the possibility of 
both contact and airborne transmission of coronaviruses; 
however, the modes of transmission of MERS-CoV spe-
cifically are not completely understood. There is no con-
sensus regarding precautionary recommendations for 
MERS-CoV; whereas the WHO recommends the contact 
and droplet precautions for all suspected cases and air-
borne precautions only for aerosol-generating procedures 
[31], the CDC advocates the use of airborne and contact 
precautions for all patient care activities [32]. Several 
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countries have taken the hard line of the CDC guidelines 
and recommend that direct healthcare workers should 
place all patients with a suspected infection in an isolated 
negative-pressure room and take adequate precautions by 
wearing two pairs of gloves, a disposable gown, and a face 
shield, and donning an N-95 respirator [28, 33, 34]. Cur-
rently, all suspected and confirmed cases should be treated 
in hospitals regardless of their medical condition, however 
transportation of patients to hospital requires additional 
emphasis, taking into account the small space of the vehi-
cle and the close contact with the patient. The few guid-
ing principles are that patients should be transported on 
a dedicated mission with the minimum number of crew 
members and should wear a surgical mask, if tolerated. 
The direct healthcare providers should wear the aforemen-
tioned PPE against contact and airborne transmission and 
avoid cough- or aerosol-generating procedures unless nec-
essary. In addition, all transportations of patients should 
be coordinated with public health services [35].
Recommendations for travelers to and 
from affected countries
The WHO guidelines do not include a travel warn-
ing for countries endemic for MERS-CoV. However, it 
urges travelers to refrain from contact with persons with 
acute respiratory symptoms, maintain vigilant personal 
hygiene, avoid eating uncooked food or unpasteurized 
milk, especially from camels, and avoid contact with 
animals and their excretions. Travelers from endemic 
countries in whom fever and acute respiratory symptoms 
develop within 14 days after their arrival should contact 
their physician as soon as possible [15].
Discussion
The recent MERS-CoV epidemic and the outbreak of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-
CoV) in 2003 emphasized that new emerging diseases 
can occur at any time and in any place without prior 
notice. MERS-CoV shares certain similarities with SARS-
CoV: both are zoonotic viruses which belong to the genus 
Betacoronavirus and can cause an acute respiratory ill-
ness which may be fatal. Although MERS-CoV has a 
higher case-fatality rate than SARS-CoV (36 vs. 10  %), 
both viruses are highly pathogenic and can apparently 
be transmitted through all routes of exposure. Moreo-
ver, currently, there are no effective vaccines or antiviral 
treatments for these diseases [36]. Failure to contain the 
outbreak in its first stages can have devastating effects, 
emphasizing the importance of a national prepared-
ness plan for unusual biological events (UBEs). There 
are some key elements to improve the readiness for 
UBEs such as MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV. (1) Contain-
ment abilities Implementation of quarantine measures 
to isolate healthy people who have been in contact with 
infected people and designated hospitals for receiving 
sick patients. (2) Infection control Given the unknown 
route of transmission, PPE against contact, droplet 
and airborne transmissions should be allocated to first 
responders. (3) Epidemic management team The need for 
a multidisciplinary team to advise the Ministry of Health 
regarding modes of action has been shown to be essential 
in the last outbreaks. Nevertheless, this consulting team 
should have routine training sessions in order to be ready 
during outbreaks. (4) Epidemiologic investigation team 
An early epidemiologic investigation is vital for contain-
ment of an outbreak and it allows early intervention that 
could prevent morbidity and mortality. Skilled teams 
with advanced epidemiologic investigation tools can 
detect earlier the index case and take prompt counter-
measures. (5) Table-top and “real-life” exercises Exercises 
should be undertaken for testing contingency plans and 
coordination between organizations. The Israeli Orange 
Flame preparedness build-up project, in which medical 
and nonmedical staff are trained at three levels: tactical, 
operational and strategic, is a good example for a com-
prehensive drill that is aimed at improving national readi-
ness and preparedness for emerging diseases [37].
Conclusions
Viral epidemics can occur anywhere in today’s “global 
village”. MERS-CoV is a relatively new virus. Effective 
national and international preparedness plans are essen-
tial to predict and control outbreaks, improve patient 
management, and ensure global health security.
Take home massages
1. MERS-CoV infection is a zoonotic disease char-
acterized clinically by fever and severe respiratory 
symptoms. It is most likely transmitted through con-
tact with camels, which are in widespread use in the 
Arabian Peninsula, where most cases originate, or 
through contact with sick patients.
2. Many countries have issued preparedness and detec-
tion guidelines for healthcare workers and for travel-
ers to endemic countries.
3. No cure for MERS-CoV is currently available. Early 
detection, appropriate infection-control measures, 
and supportive treatment are key elements in pre-
venting the next outbreak.
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